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Bimal Krishna Matilal was born in India in 1935, a dozen years before India 
gained its independence. By the time he passed away in 1991, he had a named 
chair at Oxford University. For those who work in Indian philosophy he is a 
figure that looms large, but for those working in other areas of philosophy he’s 
largely unknown. That’s unfortunate because he was a brilliant and thoughtful 
philosopher who produced interesting work on a wide range of subjects. 
Matilal initially made his name working in logic, first on Indian logic then 
later on Western logic. That by itself was not so revolutionary; what was rev-
olutionary was his approach to the subject. Rather than treating Indian logic 
as a kind of historical curio, he treated it as relevant to contemporary philo-
sophical work on universal questions. He inspired generations of scholars to 
approach texts of classical Indian thought as containing living ideas.1 
So why should metaethicists care about Matilal? Classical Indian philoso-
phy has very little explicit normative ethical theorizing, let alone obviously 
metaethical theorizing. Flip through any overview of classical Indian philos-
ophy and you’ll find a lot of epistemology, logic, and metaphysics but little, 
if any, metaethics. This is not to say that there isn’t any metaethics, but finding 
it takes some looking. And this kind of looking is difficult and time consum-
ing. This is why Matilal is a good figure to start with for metaethicists inter-
ested in Indian philosophy. He engages directly with the traditional founders 
of analytic metaethics: people like Bernard Williams, Gilbert Harman, and 
R.M. Hare. He studied at Harvard under Quine, and so he knows how to write 
like a 20th-century analytic philosopher. 
At the same time, Matilal draws on classical Indian philosophy. He picks 
out the texts and ideas that are relevant to metaethical questions. In this respect 
                                                        
1 See Ganeri (2017) and Chakravarti (2017) for more on Matilal’s life and philo-
sophical approach. 
 he’s similar to another philosopher of his generation: Philippa Foot. Foot’s 
work in metaethics develops ideas from Aristotle, Aquinas, and Nietzsche in 
interesting ways that make one reconsider those historical figures.2 In the 
same way, Matilal’s work develops ideas from Nāgārjuna, the Mahābhārata, 
and Jainism into a novel and interesting metaethical view. This makes Matilal 
an ideal figure for metaethicists curious about Indian philosophy. He has lin-
guistic and cultural expertise but writes in English and engages with founda-
tional figures in Western metaethics. 
Just as Foot’s work responded to then-popular trends in expressivism, Mati-
lal’s deals with the once-dominant cultural relativism. Since the clash of cul-
tures and the hazards of relativism were a lived reality for him, he has many 
sensible things to say about them. But implicit in these responses is an inter-
esting metaethical view. Our aim here is to explain this view and its roots in 
classical Indian philosophy. 
1. Matilal Contra Relativism 
Matilal argues against cultural relativism, which he characterizes essentially 
as the view that there are no cross-cultural moral standards. He bases his ob-
jections on two principles. The first he calls the Impossibility of the Individu-
ation of Cultures (or IIC). Real cultures, Matilal thinks, are not “dead water-
tight compartments”; rather, they flow into each other. The second principle 
is a relatively familiar one. It says that, if relativism were true, we would have 
to call the intuitively worst moral offenses morally right, as long as the of-
fenders behaved according to the norms of their own culture. The best we can 
do is to call them wrong “from our point of view”. Matilal calls this the Re-
pugnant Consequence (or RC). 
Matilal distinguishes two species of cultural relativism, which he calls soft 
relativism and hard relativism. Both claim that there are no cross-cultural 
moral standards. He sometimes puts this in terms of mutual incommensura-
bility: there is no fact about whether one culture’s standards are superior to 
another’s. So both forms of relativism share an anti-realist metaphysics of 
value. They are differentiated by their epistemic claims. According to soft rel-
ativism, the moral standards set in a culture different from one’s own are nev-
ertheless still intelligible or comprehensible. According to hard relativism, 
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 moral standards in different cultures are mutually incomprehensible. The hard 
relativist thinks that the moral standards of a culture different from our own 
are forever foreign objects, untranslatable into our own concepts or para-
digms. On such a view, this mutual unintelligibility underwrites the mutual 
incommensurability. We cannot rank one culture’s moral standards against an-
other’s because we cannot even get the two to be talking in the same terms. 
Matilal’s two main targets are the sophisticated versions of relativism en-
dorsed by Bernard Williams and Gilbert Harman.3 Before really addressing 
these, though, he first dispenses with a form of relativism that Williams calls 
vulgar relativism. Vulgar relativism claims that (1) we ought to tolerate other 
cultures’ moral perspectives, since (2) terms like ‘right’ just mean ‘right for a 
given society’ – in other words, ‘right for them’. Matilal here simply defers to 
Williams’s own refutation of vulgar relativism, one that contemporary readers 
will likely recognize. In saying (1), we implicitly endorse a universal, non-
relative moral claim, namely that we should tolerate the views of other cul-
tures. But (2) bars us from endorsing any non-relative moral claims. So the 
view looks incoherent. 
The version of relativism that Williams defends is more restricted. For Wil-
liams, there are two ways in which cultures confront or come into contact with 
each other.4 There are real confrontations and notional confrontations. A real 
confrontation occurs when one culture’s moral system is a real option for 
members of another culture. And a moral system counts as a real option for 
someone when they could adopt that system and “not engage in extensive self-
deception”,5 “retain their hold on reality”, and perhaps even make retrospec-
tive sense of their conversion.6 What Williams means here is not at all clear, 
but that need not distract us, as this is not the point that Matilal takes issue 
with. What is important is that, if one culture’s system is not a real option for 
members of another culture, then those two cultures can confront one another 
                                                        
3 Matilal’s critiques of Williams and Harman are primarily drawn from Matilal’s 
1986 essay “Ethical Relativism and the Confrontation of Cultures”. Citations to 
Matilal’s work are drawn from two essay collections edited by Jonardon Ganeri 
and published in 2002: Ethics and Epics and Mind, Language, and World. To 
maintain a sense of historical context, we have used the dates of the original 
publications for each essay, but page numbers will refer to these 2002 collec-
tions. 
4 Williams does not mean ‘confrontation’ in any combative sense. 
5 Williams (1985, 160). 
6 Williams (1974, 223). 
 only notionally. As examples, Williams offers the moral systems of bygone 
eras: Bronze Age chiefs and medieval samurai, as well as traditional societies 
whose systems and ways of life are incompatible with current, irreversible 
technological advancements. Whatever exactly counts as a real option, those 
moral systems are simply inaccessible to us.7 Finally, it’s only in the context 
of notional confrontations that we face relativism. When two cultures can re-
ally confront each other rather than merely notionally confront each other, we 
aren’t pushed to relativistic conclusions. Williams writes that  
it is only in real confrontations that the language of appraisal – good, bad, 
right, wrong, and so on – can be applied to [the other moral system]; in 
notional confrontations, this kind of appraisal is seen as inappropriate, and 
no judgments are made.8  
He calls his view the relativism of distance.9 
Matilal counts this view as a form of relativism because two moral systems 
that can only notionally confront each other are incommensurable, that is, we 
cannot think that one is better than the other. Furthermore, he counts it as a 
form of soft relativism, since Williams nowhere claims that systems that allow 
for only notional confrontation must also be mutually unintelligible. Matilal 
presents two worries for this view. First, he argues that it’s unclear why we 
should think that any moral system is not a real option for any culture. We 
can’t literally go back and be Bronze Age chiefs. But surely that isn’t all that 
Williams means. He seems to be saying something stronger, such as that some 
cultures are so conceptually or socially distant that only notional confrontation 
is possible. But why think that we couldn’t, for example, disavow our modern 
technologies and opt for life in a traditional society? The only barriers to this 
are practical (if there actually aren’t any such communities left) or epistemic 
(if we don’t know enough about its moral system). Aside from these philo-
sophically uninteresting senses in which bygone cultures are inaccessible, 
there’s no further sense in which they are. Moreover, any living culture is a 
real option for any other living culture. No actual culture is a windowless 
monad perfectly sealed off from the rest of the world. This is Matilal’s IIC 
principle, the Impossibility of the Individuation of Cultures. 
                                                        
7 For his defense of relativism, see Williams (1974) and Williams (1985). 
8 Williams (1985, 161). 
9 For more on Williams’s relativism of distance, see Fricker (2010). 
 His second objection provisionally grants that some cultures can only con-
front each other notionally but denies that this entails their mutual incommen-
surability. First, it is question-begging to suppose that such cultures couldn’t 
apply non-relative standards to each other. Moreover, this supposition con-
flicts with the linguistic data: we do in fact apply appraising language when 
talking about bygone moral systems. We say that slavery was wrong, for ex-
ample, and that our current system is better. And if we deny this, we must face 
RC, the Repugnant Consequence. 
Matilal then turns to Harman’s relativism, according to which our judg-
ments (and statements) about how people ought to act or which actions are 
wrong are relativized to groups that have formed agreements or have come to 
understandings with each other.10 Harman offers a few examples, involving 
Martians, a band of cannibals, a mob-like group called ‘Murder, Incorpo-
rated’, and Hitler. Harman thinks that, whatever we might say of members of 
these groups – that they behave unjustly, that it is a bad thing for them to go 
around killing others, even that they are evil – we fall short of saying that they 
ought not kill others or that it is wrong for them to do so. Such statements 
strike Harman as sounding very odd because such agents are “beyond the mo-
tivational reach of the relevant moral considerations”.11 They are simply be-
yond the pale – creatures that we, in some deep way, just cannot make sense 
of. 
There are three objections Matilal offers here. First, he thinks that Harman, 
like Williams, unfairly represents the linguistic situation. We hear people call 
Hitler’s and the mob’s actions wrong all the time. More importantly, though, 
Matilal argues that Harman runs afoul of both IIC and RC. Harman’s choice 
of Martians is telling. As others have more recently argued,12 it’s hard to know 
what to make of these bizarre cases. It’s not clear how reliable our linguistic 
or metaethical intuitions concerning them are. This is because real cultures are 
not hermetically sealed things, and imagining cultures this way will not, Mati-
lal thinks, be philosophically revealing. In order to get Harman’s relativist in-
tuitions we have to imagine cases of Martians, that is, literal aliens, or else 
“monsters (Hitler), mentally deranged or impaired persons (Murder, Inc), or 
subhumans”.13 In short, these cases implicitly try to circumvent IIC. But real 
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11 Harman (1975, 8). 
12 See Dowell (2016). 
13 Matilal (1986/2002, 224). 
 cultures do flow into each other, and no culture is so sealed off that we have 
no moral purchase on it. Last, Harman effectively attempts to avoid RC by 
allowing that we can call a figure like Hitler evil – it’s just that we can’t call 
his actions wrong or say that he did things that he ought not to have done. But 
in giving up these latter claims, Harman still says something quite repugnant. 
2. Emptiness and Culture 
Matilal’s insights about culture draw on an important concept from classical 
Indian philosophy, the Buddhist notion of emptiness (in Sanskrit, śūnyatā). 
Matilal draws on this idea in claiming that it is impossible for any culture to 
be completely isolated and self-reliant. 
Emptiness is most closely associated with the Madhyamaka school of Bud-
dhism and its founder Nāgārjuna (~150–250 CE), who makes frequent appear-
ances in Matilal’s writings.14 Nāgārjuna famously claimed that everything is 
empty. But what does that mean? Being empty does not mean simply not ex-
isting; emptiness is not to be understood as nothingness. To be empty is to be 
empty of something. The mug on my desk is empty of coffee but not of air. In 
the context of Buddhist philosophy, what all things are empty of is a static and 
independent nature (in Sanskrit, svabhāva). 
One way that a thing can be empty is temporal. Think of the spoke on a 
bicycle wheel. Though it may seem to be a singular object, it is really a col-
lection of particles organized in a certain way. So to say that it has no static 
essence isn’t just to say that it is, for example, slowly corroding or turning to 
rust. There is no spoke to corrode, a spoke just is the relational interplay be-
tween the particles that make it up. What appears to us as the spoke rusting is 
just the particles that make it up changing their relations. There’s no thing that 
went from shiny to rusty. 
But there is also another, non-temporal way in which the spoke is empty. 
Even at any instant, it exists only relationally. To be a spoke is to have a kind 
of relational identity, one that is dependent on other things. What it means to 
be a spoke is to play a certain role in a wheel and in a bicycle. And what it 
means to be a bicycle is to play a certain role for humans, to ride around and 
travel places. So a spoke, to be what it is, depends on its relations to other 
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 things, on its place in a larger content. This, according to Madhyamaka phi-
losophy, is true of everything: spokes, the particles making it up, bicycles, 
people, toads, helium, even emptiness itself. Everything depends on every-
thing else to be what it is. 
This is not to say that Matilal fully endorses this Buddhist view. You can, 
however, see the influence of this idea of emptiness in his discussion of cul-
ture. Just as a spoke is a constantly changing collection which depends on 
other things to be what it is, so too do cultures. So we find Matilal taking 
Bernard Williams to task for assuming that cultures interact like billiard balls, 
as independent things that occasionally crash into each other.15 As someone 
with a multicultural background, Matilal saw clearly that though the atomistic, 
billiard ball way of seeing things might be useful, it isn’t how reality works: 
But in practice, in today’s world, cultures and sub-cultures do flow into 
each other, interacting both visibly and invisibly, eventually effecting 
value-rejection and value-modification at every stage. This shows the vi-
tality of cultures, which are like living organisms, in which internal and 
external changes are incontrovertible facts. 
(1991a/2002, 253) 
To be clear, Matilal does not explicitly claim that cultures are empty, but the 
lesson is similar. His choice of metaphor is telling; he pictures cultures as liq-
uids flowing into each other. Cultures, like liquids, are dynamic, changing en-
tities with vague borders. Thinking of ‘Indian’ or ‘Italian’ culture as something 
singular, static, and independent, as something with a non-relational essence 
is a mistake. Not only do they change over time, but they are deeply relational, 
intertwined and dependent upon other cultures in ways that are subtle and dif-
ficult to see. 
Views about cultures that ignore these facts are doomed to fail because they 
treat a complex living thing as if it were a fossil. Matilal uses this insight to 
highlight how philosophers wishing to see cultures as static and independent 
must lean heavily on semi-fictionalized examples of past cultures and science 
                                                        
15 Matilal writes, “For the Williamsian kind of notional confrontation, we have 
to imagine two self-contained and totally isolated cultures with guaranteed im-
munity from external influence and hence with guaranteed immunity from eval-
uation and criticism from outside. Such cultures are mostly theoretical con-
structs, which sustain a defensible type of relativism” (1991a/2002, 253). 
 fiction.16 These artificial examples of cultures with independent essences are 
then generalized, giving the illusion that all cultures work this way. One need 
not accept Nāgārjuna’s more radical metaphysical stance to see this, though it 
can help illuminate Matilal’s lesson: real-life cultures just don’t work that 
way.17 
3. Matilal on Singularism and Realism 
Given his denial of relativism, it may be unsurprising that Matilal endorses a 
version of moral realism, according to which there are universal moral facts. 
Matilal does not, however, consider other views that have become common-
place in contemporary metaethics, views like speaker subjectivism, error the-
ory, or expressivism. Instead, he contrasts cultural relativism with what he 
calls singularism, the view that there is only one set of moral standards for 
everyone, and introduces his rival view, pluralism, in terms of this contrast. 
He characterizes singularism (sometimes calling it monism) as the view that 
there is only one set of moral standards to which everybody should con-
form, and it is possible to discover this singular standard of universal mo-
rality through rational means. 
(1986/2002, 218) 
Like soft and hard relativism, singularism consists of both a metaphysical and 
epistemic thesis. Metaphysically, it posits a set of standards that apply to eve-
ryone, making it a view sometimes called absolutism in contemporary par-
lance. Epistemically, it claims that this set of standards is rationally accessible 
to us all. In essence, if we each thought about morality long enough and clearly 
enough, we would discover the universal moral truth of the matter. He has in 
his sights arch rationalists, and in this he follows fellow pluralist Isaiah Berlin, 
who characterizes singularism in the following way: 
                                                        
16 See Matilal (1986/2002, 224). 
17 Matilal’s invocation of Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka when concluding his dis-
cussion of moral realism and relativism is telling: “it is a new open-ended way 
of dealing reality without the usual dogmas of empiricism. The Mādhyamikas do 
not give up the world” (1986/2002, 239). That is to say, we can reject static es-
sences, even in the moral domain, without thereby giving up on realism.  
 first, that all men have one true purpose, and one only, that of rational 
self-direction; second, that the ends of all rational beings must of neces-
sity fit into a single universal, harmonious pattern . . .; third, that all con-
flict, and consequently all tragedy, is due solely to the clash of reason with 
the irrational.18 
Rejecting singularism makes Matilal sound like a relativist. Though we won’t 
cover all of the details here, it’s worth noting that he argues that not all diver-
gence is the result of irrationality. Sometimes it is the result of completely 
reasonable, understandable diversity of moral opinion. In fact, Matilal is 
keenly concerned to take seriously the fact of moral diversity. It’s this serious-
ness that leads him to pluralism. 
Pluralism holds that there are multiple, potentially incompatible, moral 
standards. Still, it’s possible that some are better, i.e., to be prioritized, over 
others. In other words, Matilal accepts a certain amount of diversity of moral 
standards but denies that this commits him to relativism. He takes diversity to 
be compatible with an underlying moral realism. 
This metaphysical picture may sound a bit like W.D. Ross’s view.19 For 
Ross, there is a listable plurality of goods, and these different goods are not 
reducible to one another. We can even think of Matilal’s standards as contin-
uous with Ross’s goods (justice, non-maleficence, etc.). However, Ross thinks 
that there is always, in each situation, a particular right thing to do. Matilal 
disagrees. First, Matilal leaves it open that these different standards or goods 
are simply incompatible. That is, there might be cases where we cannot com-
ply with all of the standards or realize all of the varying goods. Second, Matilal 
leaves it open that these different standards or goods cannot be prioritized – 
that they are incommensurable. So he thinks that we might be unable to fully 
realize all of the plural goods, and that we might furthermore be unable to 
even weigh the different goods against each other. By contrast, while Ross 
thinks it doesn’t make sense to prioritize the goods in the abstract, he thinks 
that they can be properly ordered in any particular situation. In these ways, 
Matilal’s form of pluralism is more thoroughgoing than Ross’s. 
Matilal doesn’t claim that moral standards definitely are incompatible. In-
stead, he leaves these possibilities open. This brings us to Matilal’s epistemic 
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 thesis, which unfortunately is not always clear. He generally sounds quite 
skeptical about compatibility and commensurability, denying that there is any 
way to determinately rank moral standards. But even though we might never 
be certain about our rankings, they are (justifiably) important to us.20 That 
said, he does offer an account of how we come to know the different particular 
moral standards, as well as how we can come to know the universal moral 
standards. Given all this, it’s still not clear how exactly we should understand 
his pluralist account. Fleshing it out will be the job of the rest of the chapter. 
4. Dharma Morality 
Matilal’s pluralism appears in an incipient form the Indian notion of dharma. 
The term dharma is one of the most important in Indian philosophy; it is also 
one of the most complex, having many, many meanings. Built on a root mean-
ing to hold up or to support, it sometimes means teachings or instructions; this 
sense is typically capitalized in English, as when people write about the Bud-
dhist Dharma. It is also commonly used in a metaphysical way, referring to 
something like instantaneous experience events. 
The term also has an important normative sense, referring to social, ritual, 
legal, and moral obligations.21 There are many distinctions made within this 
sense, but here we will focus on one that distinguishes two different levels of 
obligation. One level is contingent and specific; these are called viśeṣa dhar-
mas, literally particular or individual dharmas. These include one’s obliga-
tions to a particular ruler, one’s wife, or duties specific to one’s role in soci-
ety.22 One feature of this class of dharma is that the associated obligations do 
                                                        
20 Matilal (1986/2002, 218). 
21 The domains are not always clearly separated and are disambiguated contextu-
ally. This is also true of the English word ‘wrong’. A protester, for example, 
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the domain of etiquette (“It was so wrong of him to wear that to the wedding!”) 
or aesthetics (“Pineapple on pizza is just wrong!”). Like ‘wrong’ the term 
‘dharma’ is also used in different normative domains. See Davis (2017) for 
background on the legal sense of dharma. See Krishan (1989, 52–5) and Perrett 
(2016, 24ff.) for an overview of the moral and religious senses. 
22 These are called rājadharma, strīdharma, and svadharma (sometimes also 
called varṇāśramadharma) respectively. See Sharma and Bharati (2000, 106ff.) 
for an overview of these distinctions. 
 not apply to everyone. Citizens of the United Kingdom may have special ob-
ligations to the Queen that citizens of other countries do not. The person next 
to you on the bus has obligations to their partner and children that you do not. 
Similarly people in certain roles, police officers, soldiers, judges, and fire-
fighters, can have special duties that people not in those roles lack. In this 
sense, the obligations are contingent and arise on in the context of particular 
relationships, roles, or situations. 
These contingent and particularized viśeṣa dharmas are contrasted with uni-
versal duties, known as sādhāraṇa dharma. Literally meaning general or com-
mon dharma, these are obligations that apply to all people everywhere. As you 
might imagine, what exactly is included in this category is a substantive ethi-
cal question. It commonly includes things like telling the truth, not stealing, 
and not hurting others.23 These apply to everyone regardless of their job, so-
cial role, or relationships. As we’ll see, Matilal has this in mind when he talks 
about the ‘basic moral fabric’ – general obligations that are not relativized to 
any particular person or place.24 
It’s not that sādhāraṇa dharma is real and viśeṣa dharma is not, nor do 
viśeṣa dharmas always reduce to sādhāraṇa dharmas. Many Indian philoso-
phers assume that there are multiple distinct types of value.25 Naturally, there 
are disagreements about whether different values can conflict and, if they can, 
which ones override others. The classic example of this comes from a critical 
scene in the Bhagavad Gītā, a part of the much longer epic called the 
Mahābhārata. In it Arjuna, the best archer in the world, finds himself looking 
out over a battlefield just before the fighting is about to start. Because of a 
complicated web of promises, he must fight against his relatives and teachers. 
Arjuna experiences intense inner conflict. As a warrior and as royalty it is his 
duty to fight. On the other hand, he also feels the more general duty to avoid 
bloodshed.26 
                                                        
23 These are known as satya, asteya, and ahiṃsā respectively. 
24 Matilal (1991a/2002, 255ff.). 
25 For an overview see the discussion in Perrett (2016, 29ff.) of what he calls 
‘Value Pluralism’ in Indian philosophy. Though his focus is on the puruṣārthas, 
the four main goals in life (morality, wealth, pleasure, and spiritual liberation) 
the point about a plurality of values is the same. 
26 Spoiler alert: Arjuna’s charioteer is the god Kṛṣṇa, who convinces him that he 
should fight after all. 
 Matilal often wrote about this famous scene, particularly in the context of 
moral dilemmas.27 So we find him writing: 
The situation is this: As a human being, as a loving member of the royal 
family, he feels that the killing of a grandfather and other relatives is bad; 
but as a kṣatriya [member of the warrior caste] he is told that it is his 
sacred duty to fight and kill – a classic case of moral conflict, which tends 
to inspire moral skepticism. 
(1989b/2002, 14) 
A full understanding of the scene would require contextualizing it in the much 
longer epic. What is important for our purposes is that Matilal reads this scene 
as demonstrating a case of a genuine moral dilemma. The conflict is not 
merely apparent and the values in question cannot be satisfactorily reconciled. 
He finds that accepting the possibility of such a case does not threaten moral 
realism. It highlights that values and duties must be flexible and dynamic but 
nevertheless real. To see why, it is helpful to look to his discussion of 
metaethics itself. 
5. Matilal’s Pluralism 
Matilal’s discussion of the Mahābhārata reveals a deep sympathy to the rela-
tivist’s recognition of moral diversity. So while he doesn’t think that diversity 
proves relativism, Matilal thinks the relativist gets some important things 
right. 
Recall that on Matilal’s pluralist picture, there are multiple potentially in-
compatible moral standards, a fact we see revealed in Arjuna’s dilemma. How 
this could be compatible with realism, however, is not obvious. To elucidate 
his view, he draws on the notions of sādhāraṇa dharma and viśeṣa dharma, 
which he compares to Stuart Hampshire’s “two faces of morality”.28  For 
Hampshire, morality admits of a rational side and a less-than-fully rational 
side. The former side is broadly continuous with singularist views, such as the 
                                                        
27 See, for example, Matilal (1983/2002, 6ff., 1986/2002, 227, 1989a/2002 and 
1989b/2002, 138ff.). Matilal also edited an entire volume on the subject entitled 
Moral Dilemmas in the Mahābhārata, (1989c) that begins with his own essay 
“Moral Dilemmas: Insights from Indian Epics”. This is not the only way the text 
has been read; see Dalmiya (2014) for a care-based alternative. 
28 Hampshire (1983, 2–3). 
 familiar Kantian view on which morality is both rational and absolute. The 
latter side involves those aspects of morality that are contingent: historically, 
geographically, and perhaps in other social ways. This side of morality is typ-
ically not fully articulated and may not be fully articulable, whereas the ra-
tional side is at least articulable. Matilal does not think Hampshire’s categories 
map onto his own, but he wants to draw out a common thread they share. 
Hampshire’s view shares with dharma morality the thought that there are 
different, possibly conflicting, but nevertheless bona fide moral standards. 
They also share the idea that some moral standards are contingent, but that 
contingency doesn’t undermine a standard’s normative force or status. 
Sometimes Matilal refers to these as two “layers” or “aspects” of morality 
(1986/2002, 232), though most frequently as its two “sides” (1986/2002, 232). 
He calls one “particularizing” side, and the other the “universalizing” side, 
which he sometimes refers to as the basic moral fabric. In an attempt to clarify 
the more contingent and particular side of morality, he writes: 
Our supposition is that there may indeed be some sort of incommensura-
bility, or ‘undercommensurability,’ and hence a sort of relativism among 
cultural norms as far as the ‘particularizing,’ the historically conditioned, 
and therefore in some sense contingent, side of morality, is concerned (cf. 
viśeṣa dharma). 
(1986/2002, 232) 
So this side of morality presents a genuine source of moral value in spite of 
contingency. This side of morality is also where Matilal tries to accommodate 
the truth he sees in relativism. There is some fundamental moral diversity, 
which may give rise to truly incommensurable moral standards. However, 
that’s not all there is to Matilal’s metaethical picture. There is also a univer-
salizing side to morality. This side doesn’t depend on our actual culture or on 
historical contingencies. Of course, we may give different accounts of what is 
universal in morality – common options appeal to our fundamental needs as 
human creatures, facts about happiness and suffering, what is required for hu-
man flourishing, or our shared rational capacities. While Matilal expresses 
some sympathies with these options, he does not commit to any particular 
account. 
Before providing a more detailed analysis of Matilal’s two-sided view, it’s 
worth briefly considering his moral epistemology. Because he thinks that there 
 are two sides to morality, he needs to offer an account of how we know each 
side, as well as the extent to which we can meaningfully and truthfully say 
that some moral standards are better than others (something that itself, it 
would seem, belongs to the universalizing side). 
We come to know the particularizing side in a straightforward and often 
anthropological way. We simply see diversity of moral standards. Admittedly, 
it’s sometimes difficult to tell when a culture’s standards count as moral, but 
that’s a matter for the sensitive anthropologist, he thinks.29 He is less clear 
about how we come to know the universal side. He sometimes suggests that 
we do (or can) know these empirically, although he also mentions the possi-
bility of using a priori methods. Take, for example, the following passage: 
If any human society is discovered by anthropologists where one or more 
of the above concerns is proven to be absent, then this notion of the uni-
versal moral fabric should be modified. I concede this possibility. Pro-
ceeding in a different vein, one may develop the notion of general moral-
ity by taking the happiness of all creatures, and the alleviation of their 
pain or suffering, as basic, and then recommend action-guides which must 
be obeyed by all. 
(1991a/2002, 259) 
In the first half he seems to be recommending empirical methods; in the sec-
ond, a priori ones. The worry is that it may be incoherent for Matilal to sim-
ultaneously endorse empirical and a priori approaches to moral knowledge. 
However, one way to read his seeming indecision or incoherence about moral 
epistemology is just as a presentation of the different epistemological accounts 
that could accompany these different substantive views about moral standards. 
After all, Matilal isn’t committed to any substantive account of what the uni-
versal moral standards are. He claims only that acknowledging a plurality of 
moral standards need not lead to relativism; i.e., that such an acknowledgment 
is compatible with realism and the existence of some universal standards. 
This is, then, the first attempt at a more filled-in picture of Matilal’s positive 
view. Still, there are some lingering questions. How exactly do these two sides 
of morality fit together? How is it possible that one side can be more or less 
relativist and the other side more or less absolutist? Doesn’t this view just 
                                                        
29 His views seem consistent with, for example, the thought that the inherent mo-
tivational force of moral judgments could help us determine when we are en-
countering a moral standard. 
 seem like Matilal trying to have his cake and eat it too? In order to better 
understand Matilal’s pluralism, it’s important to look at another Indian philo-
sophical tradition, the one that most conspicuously inspires his moral and 
metaethical views. 
6. Jainism and Anekānta-vāda 
In giving this dual-level realist account, Matilal draws on ideas from a tradi-
tion in Indian philosophy called Jainism. A renunciant religious movement 
appearing around the same time as Buddhism (~500 BCE), Jainism is a living 
tradition most well-known for its nonviolence.30 Though it has not been stud-
ied as much as Buddhism in the West, Jainism also has a rich philosophical 
tradition. Of particular interest is the concept of non-onesidedness or 
anekānta. In his book on Jaina philosophy, Matilal focused on anekānta, 
claiming that it is equally as important as the Buddhist concept of emptiness.31 
Anekānta-vāda literally means the doctrine of not being one-sided. It is a 
conceptual tool to make sense of conflicting viewpoints while still accepting 
realism. The best way to see what it means is through a classic image. Imagine 
several people, all blind from birth, are presented with an elephant. They each 
reach out and touch different parts of it and so, when asked what an elephant 
is like, they each give very different answers. The one who touches the leg 
says it’s like a big tree, the one who touches the trunk says it’s like a snake, 
the one who touches the tusk says it’s like a spear, the one who touches the 
tail says it’s like a broom, and so on. Hearing all of these different answers 
they begin to fight with each other, each denying the claims of all the others.32 
The person who says the elephant is like a spear does not say something 
false, after all the elephant does have a tusk and it is sharp like a spear. But 
that is only part of the story; if he says that the elephant is only like a spear his 
claim is one-sided (or ekānta). This person mistakes part of the story for the 
                                                        
30 Nonviolence here meaning ahiṃsā. For an overview of Jain philosophy, see 
Long (2009) and Fohr (2015). 
31 Matilal (1981, 1). Matilal’s comments seem to have gone unheeded; while 
there has been much interest in Buddhist emptiness among contemporary ana-
lytic philosophers, few works focus on anekānta. 
32 This is our own paraphrase of the story; there are many, many versions. The 
earliest written version is found in a Buddhist text called the Tīttha Sūtta (Udāna 
6.4), though the story is likely older and not exclusive to either the Buddhists or 
the Jainas. 
 whole story, a partial truth for the whole truth. Anekānta-vāda is a collection 
of tools that allow one to acknowledge partial truths without mistaking them 
for the whole truth. 
So some one-sided views do really get at one aspect of reality. But reality, 
on this picture, is complex and multifaceted, so getting at the whole truth re-
quires various conceptual tools to synthesize these various one-sided views. 
These tools involve logic, philosophy of language, and epistemology.33 In the 
philosophy of language there is theorizing about implicit indexical modifiers: 
each of the claims about the elephant is true if it includes an implicit “from 
my point-of-view”.34 In epistemology there is formal development of the dif-
ferent points of view that claims are indexed to.35 Finally, there is a work on 
the logical relations between these claims and standpoints.36 
Historical and technical issues aside, a few features of the Jaina view are 
worth emphasizing. First, the strategy of defusing disagreement by indexing 
claims to points of view resembles strategies used by moral relativists. In the 
same way that apparently conflicting claims about the elephant are resolved 
by indexing them to the points of view of the different people, cultural rela-
tivists resolve apparently conflicting value claims by indexing them to differ-
ent cultures. 
Unlike relativist views, however, the Jaina picture is at heart a realist one. 
There is, after all, an objective, mind-independent fact of the matter about how 
the elephant is. The relativizing makes their respective claims true but only in 
a limited way. One reason not to interpret Anekānta-vāda as a kind of relativ-
ism is that it would be self-undermining (Is Anekānta-vāda itself only true 
from a certain point of view? Is its negation also true from some points of 
view?). There is an objective truth, but it is complex and hard (if not some-
                                                        
33 See Ganeri (2001, 128–50) for a philosophical explanation of these develop-
ments and Balcerowicz (2008) for a more historical treatment. 
34 This idea, called syādvāda, is a way of diffusing surface-level disagreements 
by adding an implicit modifier (syāt) to claims that indexes them to certain 
points of view. See Gokhale (1991) and Matilal (1991b). 
35 Traditionally the types of standpoints are divided into seven classes. See Cort 
(2000, 325–6) and Ganeri (2001, 134 ff.) for accessible overviews. 
36 See Ganeri (2002), Priest (2008), and Gorisse (2017) for more detailed discus-
sions of Jaina logic. 
 times impossible) to assert; as Matilal puts it, “The total truth, the Jainas em-
phasize, may be derived from the integration of all different viewpoints.”37 
After all, integrating the claims of the different blind people can produce a 
pretty accurate picture of the elephant. 
Matilal’s approach to logic embodies this Jaina inspiration. His approach 
was revolutionary in part because it did not treat Indian and Western logics as 
making claims entirely relativized to their own systems. Instead he treated 
them as offering different perspectives on the same reality. Drawing on Jaina 
thought he has a similar approach in metaethics, one that acknowledges plu-
rality at one level but also allows for a deeper mind-independent reality. Of 
course, the Jaina doctrine was typically used in the context of different meta-
physical views, not for value disagreements between cultures. Nevertheless, 
Matilal’s view suggests that a similar framework can be used in the ethical 
domain to produce a view that is both realist and sensitive to cultural differ-
ences. 
7. A Jaina Pluralism 
Thinking through the elephant analogy in the moral case will give us a better 
picture of Matilal’s pluralism. Like blind men, members of different cultures 
grope around for the basic moral fabric, the universal moral standards. The 
fabric is quite large, though, and each of us can only access a part of that fab-
ric. The part that members of our culture can touch feels very different from 
the part that members of distant cultures can touch. Though there is a basic 
moral fabric, it’s possible that some of us fail to touch the fabric at all – in the 
same way that some blind man may actually be touching a broom rather than 
the elephant. Perhaps we can talk to each other and form theories, either of 
expanded regions of the fabric or even of the whole thing. And nothing either 
precludes or guarantees the possibility that some of us might eventually get it 
right. 
Given this inspiration, the best way to think about Matilal’s metaethical 
view is that, at one level, there really are universal moral standards. We try, to 
                                                        
37 Matilal (1977/2002), 58; see also the discussion in Ganeri (2001, 147–9). Cort 
(2000) and Long (2009, 119) also point out that Anekānta-vāda was historically 
used to assert Jaina superiority over other schools, so it’s unlikely that it was in-
tended as just another point of view among many. 
 varying degrees of success, to capture those universal standards in our cul-
ture’s moral outlooks, and the confrontation of cultures (analogous to a meet-
ing of two of the blind men) may improve and expand those outlooks. We also 
try, to varying degrees of success, to describe the basic moral fabric through 
theories involving things like happiness and suffering, basic human needs, or 
our rational capacities. While Matilal seems to think it’s possible that some 
such view in fact provides a full picture of the basic moral fabric, it would be 
very hard – or maybe even impossible – to be certain whether any view gets 
it right. 
That said, Matilal also appears open to the possibility of genuine incom-
mensurability and genuine moral conflict. Perhaps the best way to square this 
with his pluralist realism is to say that genuine moral conflicts only (but inev-
itably) exist given our actual, limited epistemological situation. Matilal may 
leave room for incommensurability because he thinks it could be impossible 
for us to grasp the entire moral fabric at once. Think of the elephant analogy, 
but modify it so that no single person can touch the whole thing, and so each 
one extrapolates a best explanation, but one which is fed by their own limited 
perspective. On that view, incommensurability and conflict could be inevita-
ble, but wouldn’t undermine the core realist thought. 
Ultimately, Matilal’s view seems to be that morality exists at both the uni-
versal level and the particular level. Our best substantive account of what ex-
ists at the universal level will probably be quite meager. Maybe all we can get 
is a luckily correct but impossible-to-verify picture of what goes on there. 
More optimistically, we might be able to get a justified but only rough picture 
of the basic moral fabric – like a hazy outline of the elephant. But like Kant’s 
view of the noumenal realm, Matilal’s view allows us to be aware of the ex-
istence of a universal moral standard, even if we don’t know what it’s like.38 
Though Matilal himself doesn’t say this, we can see the distinction between 
sādhāraṇa dharma and viṣeśa dharma in a similar light: individual viṣeśa 
dharmas are particular takes on the universal sādhāraṇa dharma, which we 
can only piece together in a limited way. So Arjuna’s specific duties as a war-
                                                        
38 Matilal frequently talks of ‘levels’ or ‘sides’ of morality. This evokes the Jaina 
claim that reality is multifaceted, with different sides having seemingly contra-
dictory properties. The analog in value here is incommensurability; though Mati-
lal doesn’t assert that the values are incommensurable, he leaves it open that 
they are. 
 rior are indeed part of the universal fabric of morality, just seen from a partic-
ular point of view. His particular obligations, though not universal, are real 
but not the whole story.39 
Matilal’s pluralism, in the end, takes the form of metaethical realism, but 
with a somewhat novel moral epistemology, and combines it with normative 
or first-order pluralism. His view is not thoroughly pluralist at the metaethical 
level. A thoroughly pluralistic metaethics would hold that, for example, real-
ism and cultural relativism were somehow both ultimately correct. Matilal ac-
cepts realism but wants to reject singularism. For Matilal, the existence of 
multiple, possibly incompatible, and incommensurable moral standards is in-
timately intertwined with his metaethical view. Though relativism is a mistake 
arising from our limited knowledge, it has a core truth that a sophisticated 
pluralist realism can capture. 
8. Lessons 
We haven’t presumed to say all there is about Matilal’s pluralist metaethics. 
We have hoped, however, to suggest that there is an interesting and underex-
plored account here, one that is inspired by classical Indian thought as well as 
20th-century debates in metaethics. 
He suggests, first, that realism is not the same as moral singularism or ab-
solutism. An identification of realism with singularism still seems to motivate 
many people to adopt relativism. Realism seems to be in some way insuffi-
ciently compatible with the facts of moral diversity. Matilal offers a view that 
explicitly takes this into account, unlike some contemporary views that merely 
gesture at the fact that realism is not committed to singularism. 
Second, Matilal offers us a different and more sensitive account of what we 
as theorists are responsible for. He claims that singularism encourages moral 
jingoism, that singularists are more likely to be nationalistic and xenophobic. 
Similarly, he thinks that relativism promotes moral insouciance, that relativ-
ists are more likely to be indifferent to real moral wrongs. He sometimes goes 
even further, arguing that relativism at its worst encourages liberal colonialism 
and oppression. He argues that what motivates the relativism of liberal colo-
nialists is the thought that their own culture is radically and fundamentally 
different from foreign cultures. 
                                                        
39 Thanks to Jonardon Ganeri for drawing our attention to this connection. 
 A now common concern for cultural criticism is that this liberal perspective 
gives with one hand what it takes with the other: it offers tolerance but at the 
price of radical Othering. Matilal sees precisely this problem in Harman’s 
cases. Unfamiliar cultures are seen as analogous to Martians: an otherworldly 
group whose values are utterly unrecognizable. Buoyed by this view, we may 
start to form “a love of exotic rituals” and even “resist the liberal forces in the 
native’s own tradition and let superstitions, conservatism and fundamentalism 
take over” (1991a/2002, 260). Of course, he doesn’t contend that singularism 
entails jingoism, nor that relativism entails insouciance or Othering. 
But Matilal is aware that, as humans, theorists do not always believe pre-
cisely in proportion to what is entailed. We slip too easily into nearby views 
and too easily fall into patterns of unlicensed attitude and feeling. As theorists, 
we can take his suggestion to heart, not only in thinking about the connections 
between these different views but in thinking about how we treat cultures 
themselves in metaethical discourse. In the contemporary world, cultures 
simply are not isolated things. And even if we were to encounter a heretofore 
unknown culture, that encounter would itself be a confrontation of two cul-
tures. Cultures change each other – even colonizers are changed by the colo-
nized. With these thoughts in mind, we can see why Matilal thinks that many 
examples used to support cultural relativism are at best imperfectly imagined 
and at worst betray a false and offensive Othering. 
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